NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/SR.3

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

11 June 2009

Original: English

Third session
New York, 4-15 May 2009

Summary record of the 3rd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday 5 May 2009, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:	Mr. Chidyausiku	(Zimbabwe)
later:	Mr. Tarui (Vice-Chairman)	(Japan)
later:	Mr. Chidyausiku	(Zimbabwe)

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

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Hernández** (El Salvador) said that, given the dangers inherent in the use of nuclear weapons, El Salvador wondered about the potential response by an affected State or the international community to their use by non-State actors and what responsibilities their home Governments or authorities might bear. It also wondered about guarantees that even limited use of nuclear weapons by States would not lead to a broader or disproportionate response that would heighten the nuclear threat. Because those questions remained unanswered, States must examine such hypothetical situations, and adopt measures to prevent non-State actors and States from obtaining and using nuclear weapons and strengthen the legal regime for disarmament and non-proliferation by fully respecting and reinforcing existing international instruments through more accessions and ratifications and the negotiation of new agreements.

2. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must be revitalized. Nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States must comply fully with their nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI and implement the thirteen practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, including joining the control and verification regimes under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. El Salvador commended IAEA for its work to prevent diversion of fissile material or nuclear technology for non-peaceful use.

3. El Salvador believed that the conditions existed to start negotiations for a legally binding treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. The international community must agree to a total moratorium on tests and ensure the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The ratification of that Treaty by Colombia and the commitment of the new United States administration to do so were welcome.

4. While multilateralism was important in promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, bilateral efforts should also be encouraged. Her delegation welcomed the commitments by the United States of America and the Russian Federation to hold talks that would lead towards the replacement of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (START I).

5. Sustainable, transparent and stable relations based on trust, not deterrence, were the way towards international peace and security and El Salvador had rejected nuclear deterrence as a strategic military doctrine. A universal and legally binding instrument under which nuclear-weapon States would unconditionally guarantee not to threaten to use or use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States was a matter of urgency. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, El Salvador reiterated its full support for all bilateral and multilateral endeavours that promoted disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Confidence-building measures and the strengthening of international law played an important role in guaranteeing international peace, stability and security.

6. **Mr. Yelchenko** (Ukraine) said his country had demonstrated its commitment to a strong nuclear non-proliferation regime by renouncing its nuclear capability and acceding to the Treaty in 1994. Ukraine thus called on the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reverse its decision to withdraw from the six-party talks, cease IAEA cooperation and restore its nuclear facilities. It also called on States that were not yet party to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

7. Disarmament through reductions in weapons and stockpiles must be irreversible, transparent and verifiable. Ukraine called on States, especially Annex 2 States, to sign and ratify CTBT and respect a moratorium on nuclear testing. It welcomed the accession by Timor-Leste and ratification by Lebanon and noted with satisfaction the importance given by the new United States administration to CTBT.

8. Ukraine reaffirmed its support for IAEA and commended its safeguards work. It supported the universalization of safeguards agreements and additional protocols as the verification standard, for the Treaty. While the deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament was regrettable, the approach proposed in the Presidents' non-paper could advance the Conference's work, especially a fissile material cut-off treaty. An international legally binding instrument on credible negative security assurances would enhance the non-proliferation regime; his delegation encouraged nuclear-weapon States to reconsider their

positions. Nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as the one recently established in Central Asia, should continue to be promoted. Further, the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference remained valid until its goals and objectives had been achieved. Ukraine attached great importance to implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and proposed that a reference to the resolution could be inserted in the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

9. The 2010 Review Conference should allow progress on such issues as greater transparency and verifiable mechanisms for reductions in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances to draft a universal, non-conditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; international cooperation to promote multilateralism in the fuel cycle and supply; consideration of additional measures to further strengthen the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities in the light of the heightened risk of nuclear terrorism; additional measures to bring CTBT into force; a response to withdrawal from the Treaty; and improvement of the NPT review process.

10. **Mr. Natalegawa** (Indonesia) said that, while some nuclear-weapon States had continued to rely on nuclear weapons in their military doctrine over the past decade, civil society, Government leaders and academia had intensified the campaign for their elimination. Indonesia welcomed recent statements by nuclear-weapon States regarding disarmament, reiterating that progress required a balanced, comprehensive and non-discriminatory approach to the three pillars of the Treaty. The United States of America and the Russian Federation in particular, must lead by example, and he welcomed their joint statement on the replacement for START I and the United States commitment to ratify CTBT.

11. With an apparent consensus arising at the Conference on Disarmament, Indonesia felt that negotiations for a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty could begin based on the Shannon report and its mandate. Complete disarmament would need benchmarks, timetables and specific steps agreed to by all States parties. Momentum towards a nuclear-weapon-free world opened the way politically to a nuclear weapon convention.

12. The very existence of nuclear arsenals constituted possible use; therefore proposals by non-nuclear-weapon States for universal, non-conditional and legally binding security assurances must be a priority. Nuclear weapons must be outlawed in order to prevent States from obtaining them and to push nuclear-weapon States to expedite their disarmament commitments and obligations. The transparency of full implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol could strengthen the non-proliferation regime and facilitate cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

13. While Indonesia welcomed the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, it was dissatisfied with slow progress towards such a zone in the Middle East. Regarding the Korean Peninsula, he urged the parties concerned to resume dialogue within the context of the six-party talks. As for Iran, his delegation was encouraged by the new United States approach and the readiness of concerned parties to hold talks and negotiate without preconditions, on the basis of mutual interest and respect.

14. Indonesia called on States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. However, nuclear cooperation between States parties and non-parties, could effectively encourage non-participation, which was regrettable.

15. **Ms. Gottemoeller** (United States of America) said that her Government believed that the Treaty's framework was sound but that it must be strengthened to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism. Verification and compliance must be improved and responsible use of nuclear energy by all States fostered. Cooperation and shared understanding would enable States to strengthen the pillars of the Treaty and restore confidence in its credibility and effectiveness.

16. The United States of America would seek balance in the emphasis on the three pillars of the Treaty in the review process. Regarding the disarmament pillar, the United States and Russia would replace START I with a legally binding agreement that would usher in further cuts in nuclear weapons. President Obama and Russian Federation President Medvedev had stated that cuts would be deeper than in existing arms control agreements and that the replacement for START should

include verification measures based on experience with its implementation. In addition to ratification of CTBT, her Government would launch a diplomatic effort with the other States whose ratifications were needed for the CTBT to enter into force. It would seek a fissile material cut-off treaty, which, by limiting fissile material worldwide, could help to secure such material against theft or seizure by terrorists. The negotiation of a verifiable treaty was her country's top priority at the Conference on Disarmament and, despite the long-standing failure to achieve consensus, the United States hoped that its renewed flexibility would enable negotiations to commence. She reaffirmed her Government's unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and called on all other Governments, especially the other nuclear-weapon States, publicly to declare or reaffirm their intention to join that moratorium, along with the moratorium on nuclear explosive tests.

17. In order to build confidence that further reductions in nuclear weapons could be made without undermining international peace and security, it was critical for parties to comply fully with their obligations. To that end, greater resources and authority were required to strengthen international inspections, and much of that increase should go to IAEA, whose systems of safeguards was vital in verifying compliance with non-proliferation obligations. Efforts must be redoubled to update IAEA safeguards technologies and convince parties that had not yet done so to bring into force the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements required by article III of the Treaty. The universal entry into force of the Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements must also be pursued vigorously. Universal NPT adherence, including by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea, remained a fundamental objective of the United States, and consequences for those breaking the rules or withdrawing from the Treaty without cause must be addressed. The United States hoped that parties to the Treaty would propose ways to develop such consequences.

18. As States pursued additional, complementary measures, the basis of the Treaty would be strengthened. A campaign to ensure that all nuclear materials were secured or eliminated and that commerce in nuclear material and technology supported solely peaceful uses was necessary to prevent proliferation to States and to terrorists, the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.

19. Her Government fully recognized and supported the pillar of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by all States, but it must be based on compliance with rules, including non-proliferation obligations. The United States had led global cooperation in nuclear energy to benefit mankind and would continue to contribute substantial resources in that area for peaceful purposes, through IAEA and bilaterally, in line with the highest safety and non-proliferation standards. The power of nuclear energy must be harnessed to combat climate change. IAEA member States were considering a nuclear fuel bank, to which the United States Government was contributing nearly $50 million, to reassure countries embarking on or expanding nuclear power programmes and complying fully with their non-proliferation obligations that they would not be subject to disruptions in commercial supplies. It could also show that buying expensive enrichment and reprocessing facilities was not necessary to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

20. While it remained concerned that further coordination was needed to strengthen the Treaty, the United States reaffirmed its indefinite extension in 1995, along with other decisions, including the Middle East resolution. Her delegation hoped that procedural arrangements for the Review Conference would be settled quickly so that substantive objectives could be pursued.

21. **Mr. Çorman** (Turkey) said that Turkey advocated global, overall disarmament and supported international efforts to achieve international security through arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Turkey was also a party to all international non-proliferation instruments and export control regimes and meticulously fulfilled its obligations thereunder. Such instruments should be implemented effectively, strengthened further and universalized.

22. Turkey regarded the Treaty as the cornerstone of global non-proliferation and disarmament and was fully committed to implementing all three pillars thereof. He noted with satisfaction that the approach promoted by Turkey — that of equal and balanced treatment of all three pillars — had gained increased support. The NPT regime, though not perfect or universal, had been instrumental in curbing nuclear

proliferation, inspiring further steps towards disarmament and establishing a fair system of international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was a unique instrument to which no viable alternative was in sight.

23. Turkey also attached great significance to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a possible first step towards overcoming the difficulties surrounding non-proliferation and disarmament. States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty should do so as early as possible, especially if their ratification was required for the Treaty to enter into force. Until then, States should abide by a moratorium on nuclear explosions and avoid action that was contrary to the Treaty's provisions. The initiation of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty, meanwhile, could pave the way for progress on various fronts, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the prevention of an arms race in space.

24. The 2005 Review Conference's inconclusive outcome should not lead to pessimism. Achievements at earlier review conferences were testimonies to the expertise, knowledge and wisdom long associated with the NPT regime. The nuclear disarmament measures agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had culminated in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, while the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000 had demonstrated the possibility of reaching unanimity, even in tough times. It was important to build upon such accomplishments. A reaffirmation by nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to the 13 practical steps at the 2010 Review Conference would be particularly welcome.

25. Turkey would continue to work towards universalization of the Treaty, further reductions in nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system. Turkey regarded comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocols thereto as the current IAEA verification standard. It also valued highly the establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction wherever feasible. Such a zone would be particularly welcome in the Middle East. All parties concerned should seek to reach a common regional understanding on the project.

26. To protect the integrity and credibility of the NPT, all parties must make a renewed commitment to its principles and objectives. It was time to recapture the spirit of 1995 and 2000. Simultaneous progress on the Treaty's three pillars would revalidate its status as the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation and provide a sound basis for the pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

27. *Mr. Tarui (Japan), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

28. **Ms. Kolontai** (Belarus) recalled that Belarus had been the first country to renounce voluntarily the opportunity to take ownership of the nuclear weapons left in its territory following the fall of the Soviet Union. States parties should remember the significance of nuclear disarmament as a strategic goal of the Treaty and use the forum of the Conference on Disarmament to push forward discussions on a fissile material cut-off treaty, nuclear disarmament matters, negative security assurances and preventing an arms race in outer space. Belarus welcomed the commitment of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, to show leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world.

29. Providing non-nuclear-weapon States with legally binding security assurances would increase confidence and predictability in international relations, strengthen the non-proliferation regime and give the Treaty the requisite universality. The States parties should not neglect the regional aspects of implementation of the Treaty, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which would help to consolidate non-proliferation and encourage nuclear disarmament.

30. The existing instruments and IAEA mechanisms should be exploited to ensure that nuclear technology was used only for peaceful purposes. Belarus was among the many countries to have pursued sustainable economic growth through proposed peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It intended to develop its national nuclear programme in close cooperation with IAEA, believing that such an approach would lay the basis for the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities and proper handling of radioactive sources, spent fuel and nuclear waste.

31. **Ms. Juul** (Norway) said that the 2010 Review Conference would be crucial for the authority of the NPT, which, though the cornerstone of collective

security for almost 40 years, was under increasing strain. Serious proliferation challenges remained, expectations regarding nuclear disarmament were far from being met, little progress had been made in establishing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, and some feared that the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy might be undermined. The broad consensus of 1995 had faded. A decade had been lost in the quest for a nuclear-weapon-free world. If the international community failed in 2010, as it had done in 2005, the NPT risked gradual erosion and possible marginalization. Such a development would undermine the world's common security.

32. That gloomy scenario could, however, be avoided. There were new and hopeful windows of opportunity. She welcomed the recent statement by United States President Obama and Russian Federation President Medvedev on a follow-on to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and recent statements by nuclear-weapon States on their commitment to eliminate fully nuclear arms. It was important to build on that momentum.

33. The 2010 Review Conference should revive a broad-based common understanding on addressing nuclear dangers and ensuring peaceful applications of nuclear technology in a more secure, nuclear-weapon-free world. It should also agree on a programme of work up until 2015 and on steps to be taken thereafter. The Preparatory Committee should lay the foundation for a successful Review Conference. It must resolve all procedural issues and agree on an agenda so that all issues relevant to the proper functioning of the NPT could be discussed at the Review Conference.

34. Even more important than the current session was the run-up to the Review Conference itself. States parties had a responsibility to contribute in a constructive manner. Preparations must be guided by a spirit of compromise. States parties must also fulfil their obligations under the NPT. The three pillars were interlinked; there could be no "NPT à la carte". Full nuclear disarmament would be achieved only when there was full confidence that no one could circumvent the non-proliferation regime. The much-needed steps to tighten up non-proliferation could be taken only if there was an unequivocal and irreversible process towards complete elimination of existing nuclear arsenals. Strengthened non-proliferation must also facilitate peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

35. To succeed, it was necessary to adopt innovative approaches, to build bridges and to reach out across regional groupings and overcome past polarizations. The NPT process should not be considered a zero-sum game. The 2010 outcome must be a win-win situation for all. To achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, it was important to mobilize all stakeholders. Civil society must be engaged fully, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academia viewed as valuable partners. The erosion of the NPT was a risk, but by no means a certainty. She urged States parties to seize the current opportunity to consolidate and to strengthen further the Treaty.

36. **Mr. Chowdhury** (Bangladesh) welcomed the renewed momentum of recent days, particularly the commitment made by key States to work towards nuclear disarmament. The only way to universalize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments was through multilateralism. He hoped that the current session would have a practical impact. His delegation would provide its full support and cooperation in that regard.

37. The NPT remained the most important instrument for attaining nuclear disarmament and non proliferation, and the CTBT was an important step forward in that regard. He reaffirmed the need for the universality of the NPT, CTBT and all major international disarmament instruments without exception. The lack of political will among some Member States had been impeding progress on disarmament and non-proliferation. Statements by nuclear-weapon States and efforts by the international community must be matched by concrete action.

38. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties had a legitimate right to unconditional security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. He called for the early negotiation of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

39. Bangladesh had demonstrated its commitment to nuclear disarmament by remaining non-nuclear, by becoming a party to almost all the disarmament-related treaties and by remaining under IAEA safeguards measures. It also supported regional approaches to nuclear disarmament. He welcomed the establishment

of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the recent entry into force of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The establishment of such zones was an important step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. It also contributed to regional confidence-building measures and reduced the threat to non-nuclear-weapon States.

40. Recalling that the NPT guaranteed the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that some developing country non-nuclear-weapon States parties had benefited from cooperation with developed countries in that regard, he said that compliant States in dire need of such energy must be given technical and financial assistance. Global expenditure on armament had reached $1.4 trillion in 2007, a 45 per cent increase since 1998. Some States were clearly spending excessive amounts on armament. Such expenditure should be reduced to free up resources for pressing development challenges.

41. The run-up to the 2010 Review Conference provided an opportunity for all parties to take stock of the progress made thus far. He urged all States parties to remain fully committed to their obligations under both the NPT and the agreements reached in 1995 and 2000. Member States must adopt practical measures to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Review Conference outcome should therefore address disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and contain specific mechanisms for implementation and follow-up.

42. Lastly, he welcomed the positive developments of recent days. It was important to seize the momentum. He hoped that Member States would demonstrate flexibility and understanding so that the 2010 Review Conference adopted a consensus-based outcome that paved the way for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

43. **Mr. Hoang Chi Trung** (Viet Nam) welcomed the recent joint statement by Presidents Obama and Medvedev and the recent statement by President Obama signalling the United States' intention to lead efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. As the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the NPT must be strengthened in all its aspects. To that end, the Preparatory Committee should review achievements and shortcomings, and identify practical and appropriate ways of ensuring the full and non-selective implementation of the Treaty.

44. The only absolute guarantee against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons was their elimination. Thousands of nuclear weapons were stockpiled and deployed around the world, many of them on hair-trigger alert. To avoid nuclear disaster, solutions leading to the elimination of such weapons must be found. Until such time, nuclear-weapon States should undertake the 13 practical steps agreed in 2000. In that connection, the Review Conference should support the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and urge nuclear-weapon States to reduce the operational readiness of their nuclear weapons and to offer non-nuclear-weapon States guarantees against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. A subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament should also be established within Main Committee I.

45. Lastly, expressing support for the CTBT and its early entry into force, he welcomed the recent establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and efforts to establish such a zone in the Middle East. Such zones strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regimes in the regions concerned and enhanced regional and global peace and security.

46. **Mr. Al-Bayati** (Iraq) said that forty years on, the NPT was not yet being implemented in a balanced manner, as shown by the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their nuclear disarmament obligations, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty and the decision adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference reaffirming the objectives and principles of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States continued to flout their commitments, opting instead to develop new generations of nuclear weapons and maintain the role of such weapons in their military and security policies. States Parties to the Treaty must achieve a balance between mutual commitments and responsibilities incumbent upon nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, putting an end to the nuclear double standard was essential to the success of non-proliferation efforts. Priority must be placed on efforts to conclude an unconditional, legally binding universal instrument governing security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. The existing imbalances in the treaty and the shortcomings in some of its provisions might have grave repercussions, were such defects to go unaddressed.

47. His delegation hoped that the 2010 Review Conference would bolster the three pillars of the Treaty, and urged States to negotiate and conclude a multilateral, non-discriminatory fissile material cut-off treaty. Iraq also welcomed the initiative taken by the United States of America to reduce existing strategic arsenals and to move towards ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and a fissile material cut-off treaty. It called on all countries to implement the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, so as to boost the credibility of the NPT and the review process itself.

48. The objective of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 had been to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone, a question integral to its central purpose. Therefore, failure to deliver on the outcome of the Review and Extension Conference would have a negative impact on the very future of the NPT. The 2010 Review Conference would mark a critical juncture, at which the international community would be faced with two options: either to allow the NPT regime to collapse or to use the opportunities afforded by the Conference to make progress towards achieving the objectives of the Treaty and address the challenges that arose as a result of the failure to comply fully with its provisions. He hoped that States Parties would be able to craft constructive proposals at the current Preparatory Conference in particular to provide legally binding, unconditional assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

49. **Mr. Loulichki** (Morocco) welcomed the recent move towards collective and multilateral action on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as demonstrated by President Obama's comments in Prague and the stand taken by France and the dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation. To maximize the chances of success in 2010, the procedural pitfalls that had caused the 2005 Review Conference to fail must be avoided. To that end, the Committee must resolve all organizational and procedural issues and transmit substantive recommendations to the Review Conference.

50. The role of the NPT as a key instrument for international peace and security must be strengthened. After more than 40 years in existence, it had demonstrated its relevance and importance. Even though the world had changed, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy remained the three pillars of international action.

51. The international community must make nuclear disarmament a priority. The renewed commitment of certain nuclear powers was welcome; they must reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their military strategies and set specific deadlines for reducing their nuclear arsenals. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties must also fulfil their obligations under the NPT. Efforts by such States to acquire nuclear weapons constituted a violation of the NPT and must not be ignored. The right to benefit from international cooperation on nuclear energy for civilian purposes must be protected. Civil nuclear energy was an instrument for scientific and technological progress and must not be denied to countries that legitimately aspired to economic and social development.

52. His delegation endorsed the proposal to establish a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament within Main Committee I, stressed the importance of beginning negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and called for the early entry into force of the CTBT.

53. Morocco attached great importance to the universality of the NPT. In that regard, the 1995 resolution on the Middle East must be respected and the progress made on its implementation evaluated. Israel must accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

54. The risk of nuclear terrorism was a major challenge for international security. Cooperation must be stepped up and awareness of those dangers and their implications for security and for the environment raised. Morocco had joined and had hosted the inaugural meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In June 2009, it would host an international seminar on preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials in preparation for the annual meeting of the Global Initiative to be held in The Hague later that month.

55. **Mr. Pálsson** (Iceland) said that the NPT remained the bedrock of global security. The many challenges it had faced in recent years should harden the international community's resolve to strengthen its universality, effectiveness and authority. Noting that questions continued to arise over individual countries' commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, he urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, to rejoin the

six-party talks and to resume cooperation with IAEA, and encouraged the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate fully with IAEA and to abide by the relevant Security Council resolutions.

56. To maximize the chances of a successful Review Conference in 2010, States parties must rigorously pursue the three pillars of the NPT, without creating unhelpful or unnecessary linkages between them. The recent encouraging signs in the political arena pointed to a new era of arms control and disarmament. States parties must seize the opportunity to agree on an agenda for, and concrete recommendations to, the Review Conference.

57. The elimination of nuclear weapons had become a realistic goal. While nuclear arsenals had been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War, transparent and verifiable nuclear disarmament must be accelerated. He urged all nuclear-weapon States to take bolder steps in that regard and welcomed the recent joint statement by Presidents Obama and Medvedev and the latest nuclear disarmament measures introduced by France and the United Kingdom.

58. A verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty was vital to the lasting success of the NPT regime, as was the entry into force of the CTBT. He welcomed signatory States' renewed commitments in that regard and urged all States, particularly the remaining Annex 2 States, to ratify the CTBT at the earliest opportunity.

59. While it was the sovereign right of any country to decide its own mix of energy supply, the right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology must be reconciled with the goal of non-proliferation, particularly now that States were increasingly exploring nuclear power. The indispensable role of IAEA in promoting safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies must be fully recognized. Its comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols were essential in that regard. Noting that ensuring nuclear safety and the security of people and of their environment was a valid concern, he stressed the importance of adherence to the relevant conventions and guidelines. Lastly, tighter controls of the fuel cycle and the peaceful use of nuclear technology should be regarded as compatible goals. The adoption of a multilateral approach to the fuel cycle should be discussed further to prevent sensitive nuclear technologies from falling into the wrong hands.

60. **Mr. Migliore** (Holy See) said that unfortunately, 40 years after the NPT had entered into force, over 26,000 nuclear warheads remained in the world and some nations were still engaged in nuclear arms races, despite legally binding obligations with regard to non-proliferation and disarmament.

61. Nevertheless, his delegation was heartened by recent initiatives taken by Governments, international organizations and civil society to address nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in particular national policies and bilateral agreements to reduce nuclear arsenals. There was also a need for concrete, transparent and convincing steps in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation according to the principles set forth in the Treaty.

62. In order to build on the new momentum and to promote trust, transparency and cooperation among nations, five objectives could be reached in a short period of time, namely, the entry into force of the CTBT; the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; the interpretation by nuclear-weapon States of their military doctrines as precluding reliance on nuclear weapons; full regulation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by IAEA, whose safeguards system must be further enhanced; and the establishment of international structures for the production of nuclear fuel for the benefit of all countries.

63. The existence of nuclear-weapon-free zones attested to the fact that peace and security were possible without possessing nuclear weapons. In order to establish a proper hierarchy of values and priorities, greater common efforts were needed to mobilize resources to benefit ethical, cultural and economic development, so that humanity might turn its back on the arms race.

64. **Mr. Launer** (Austria) said that his delegation welcomed the recent commitment made by the United States of America and the Russian Federation to negotiate a new strategic arms reduction treaty by the end of that year and to include all nuclear-weapon States in that endeavour in due course. Verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament, entry into force of the CTBT and agreement on a comprehensive fissile material cut-off treaty were three elements crucial to achieving the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. Austria also endorsed the appeal by the United Nations Secretary-General to consider a nuclear weapons convention that would prohibit the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer,

use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as provide for their elimination. The nuclear-weapon States should jointly address that issue at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

65. The entry into force of the CTBT was long overdue. Along with Costa Rica, Austria had been coordinating the article XIV process on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT since September 2007; in that time, a considerable number of States had ratified the CTBT, bringing the total number to 148. His Government would continue to raise awareness of the CTBT and such scientific applications of its international monitoring system as the tsunami early warning system, in the hope that a better understanding of the benefits of the CTBT would help speed up the ratification process and its entry into force. To that end, Austria had co-sponsored outreach activities in various parts of the world. He hoped that other countries would respond to the initiative taken by the United States of America immediately and aggressively to pursue ratification by its Government of the CTBT, and called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify it without further delay.

66. The fact that the international community had not seen the mid-1960's prediction of a world of 15 or more nuclear-weapon States realized attested to the tireless verification efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency. His Government would continue to support all efforts aimed at strengthening and universalizing the IAEA Agreement on Comprehensive Safeguards and its Additional Protocol and supporting the Agency's work amid ever greater challenges.

67. The dangers related to increasing access to nuclear technology could not be ignored for the sake of short-sighted focus on national economic interests, fears of limitation of state sovereignty or loss of control over a key technology sector. In that connection, Austria was actively participating in the renewed debate on the multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle. One of the most tangible projects to date was the establishment of a nuclear fuel reserve under IAEA control. Fully endorsed by the Austrian Government and the European Union, that last-resort facility for consumer countries was intended to offer a credible alternative to the development of national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Nevertheless, fuel reserve mechanisms could only be the first step in a long journey, the ultimate goal of which should be the multilateralization of all new and existing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. In order to stimulate further discussions, Austria will circulate at the current Preparatory Conference a working paper updating positions and considerations submitted earlier in the Review Cycle.

68. **Ms. Rubiales de Chamorro** (Nicaragua) said that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had not conducted themselves in a sufficiently transparent manner nor demonstrated the necessary political will to adhere to the Treaty, as indicated by the lack of progress on the 13 practical steps towards implementation of article VI, adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

69. Nicaragua urged the nuclear-weapon States to commit to the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and in the interim, to uphold their negative security guarantees. Although the Treaty had played a crucial role in preventing vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear arms, some 26,000 remaining nuclear weapons threatened the existence of life on the planet. Furthermore, the threat of nuclear terrorism, nonexistent when the NPT had been adopted, had emerged after the attacks of 11 September 2001. Nuclear-weapon States must therefore strengthen the safeguards around their nuclear and fissile arsenals, lest they fall into the hands of terrorists.

70. Her Government hoped that the 2010 NPT Review Conference would be able to establish a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament within its Main Committee I that would address obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and establish a programme aimed at the gradual elimination of all nuclear arms. Moreover, the Treaty should in no way infringe on the inalienable right of States parties to research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful ends, and to cooperate in that area with other States parties, including the nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. The Conference on Disarmament must also make progress towards a fissile material cut-off treaty.

71. As a founding member of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone, Nicaragua welcomed the establishment of a new nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. It also called on all States of the Middle East, including Israel — the only State in the region that had declared possession of nuclear arms — to

create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in accordance with the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, so as to reduce regional tensions and promote lasting peace and security. Lastly, her Government called for the signing and ratification without delay or conditions of the CTBT by those nations that had not done so, so that the treaty could enter into force as soon as possible. Nuclear-weapon States had a particular responsibility in that area.

72. *Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe) resumed the Chair.*

73. **Mr. Wenaweser** (Liechtenstein) said that the 2010 Review Conference must restore the balance between the three pillars of the Treaty. Disarmament and non-proliferation must both be moved forward without progress in one being made conditional on progress in the other. The ultimate goal should be to make the Treaty universal by securing the accession of all remaining countries as non-nuclear-weapon States. In addition, a clear understanding should be established of the implications of withdrawal from the Treaty. From the standpoint of international law, it was clear that States parties found to be violating their obligations remained responsible for those violations even after effectively withdrawing from the Treaty.

74. The commitment of the parties to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms to a new binding agreement by the end of 2009, when the existing START-I agreement would expire, was encouraging. Ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should continue in the interests of improving nuclear safety and security. Pending the conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the States concerned should declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The IAEA non-proliferation mechanism should be strengthened by making the conclusion of additional protocols to safeguards agreements the verification standard.

75. Liechtenstein supported the proposal for a global nuclear fuel bank to guarantee supplies while minimizing the risk of proliferation. As demand for energy was likely to increase substantially, particularly in the developing world, proliferation concerns should not undermine the right of states parties to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. In order to ensure that nuclear technology was used responsibly, without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Liechtenstein supported the technical cooperation role of IAEA. It also emphasized that States must implement the mechanisms established by the Security Council in its resolution 1540 (2004) in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

76. **Mr. Hernández** (Costa Rica) said that, while his delegation fully supported the Treaty, it wondered whether irreversible disarmament and non-proliferation could be achieved on the sole basis of five-yearly conferences, with no active mechanisms for implementation and review. It therefore supported the proposal for an annual meeting to consider and take action on all aspects of the Treaty and for the bureau of the Review Conference to be reconstituted as a standing bureau that could convene extraordinary sessions of the general conference of States parties when a situation threatening the integrity or viability of the Treaty arose.

77. As safeguards reinforced mutual confidence, they should not be subject to any condition or limit. The international community should reinforce IAEA and promote the process of verification, despite the reluctance of some States to accept it, using the existing legal framework for the regulation of weapons. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was only a first step towards general and complete disarmament. It should be supplemented by a universal, legally binding, fissile material cut-off treaty.

78. Recalling that the Treaty of Tlatelolco had established the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone, Costa Rica welcomed the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and hoped that the same aim would be pursued in the Middle East and elsewhere. Regretting the failure to act fully on General Assembly resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946 on the principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments and the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Costa Rica fully supported the five-point nuclear disarmament plan proposed by the Secretary-General in October 2008.

79. **Mr. Al-Murad** (Kuwait), affirming that the United Nations and its specialized agencies played a pivotal role in addressing the challenges of

disarmament, said that Kuwait had proposed, and donated substantial resources for, the establishment of a bank of low-grade enriched nuclear fuel to be supervised by IAEA. However, the credibility and universality of the Treaty were suffering as a result of selective compliance by some States parties, leading to lack of trust and a threat to the balance of international and regional peace and stability.

80. Recalling the adoption at the 1995 Review Conference of a resolution on the Middle East calling for the establishment in that region of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, Kuwait regretted that, 14 years later, the Middle East provided an example of failure of the Treaty to achieve security for the States parties. It called on Israel, the only non-signatory and only country in the region to possess an arsenal of nuclear weapons, to accede immediately to the Treaty, eliminate its nuclear arsenal and subject all its nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards regime. The international community should also stop sales of the scientific and technological resources that enabled Israel to further strengthen that arsenal, or that aided any other country seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction.

81. While the recent commitment expressed by the United States of America and the Russian Federation was encouraging, and there was a prospect of progress on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a fissile material cut-off treaty, the States parties, having already established numerous agreements, resolutions and work plans, had shown a lack of political will. Future efforts should focus on non-selective implementation of the Treaty and expansion of the number of States parties; adherence to policy decisions including the outcome of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the final documents of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences; reaffirmation of the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and close collaboration with IAEA to dispel any ambiguities surrounding nuclear programmes through negotiation and constructive dialogue; establishment of a subsidiary body at the 2010 Review Conference under Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, and the convening of an international conference entitled "the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East by 2011".

82. **Mr. Hassan** (Sudan) said that, as a signatory to the NPT and the CTBT, Sudan insisted on full and universal implementation of both treaties. He hoped that scientific research would be deployed in the service of international peace and security and for the benefit of mankind and, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty, ensuring full respect for the inalienable right of States parties to develop technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

83. He echoed the satisfaction expressed by other delegations at the establishment of zones free of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. In that connection, his delegation expressed deep concern at the impossibility of implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, and hoped that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would not be impeded because of Israel's failure to place its installations under the IAEA safeguards regime. That matter should be given urgent attention at both the current Preparatory Conference and the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

84. Also worthy of note were the recent statements made by nuclear powers pledging to step up efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, he expressed regret at the obstacles to achieving consensus on issues of nuclear non-proliferation at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva the previous month. Indeed, the strength of the Treaty was derived not from the number of signatories or States parties but rather from their commitment to comply with its provisions.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.